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1 The Knapsack Problem
The knapsack problem (KP) is NP−complete, which means it is NP−hard and every other
NP−complete problem can be reduced to the KP (as well as to every other NP−complete
problem). The fact that it is NP−hard means that the solution to an instance of the KP
can be verified in polynomial time. However, no polynomial-time algorithm is known to solve
NP−complete problems. The following are the main reasons for choosing the KP as the task
faced by participants in our experiment:
1. Even if a participant has seen the KP before, the task is still computationally demanding.
2. Even if an instance can be solved through some simple heuristics, this cannot be guaranteed
a-priori, without previously having solved the instance.
3. The learning model whereby agents hold a prior over all possible solutions and attempt to
solve the problem by gathering ‘signals’ to Bayesian-update their prior, is not a plausible one
(just writing down the likelihood requires that one enumerate all the possible solutions).
4. The fact that the problem involves items allows for an intuitive extension to an asset market
that does not alter the computational properties of the instance at hand.
1.1 The KP in the experiment
In one experimental session the participants faced eight instances of the KP, under different
incentive schemes. The two incentive schemes were the ‘Prize’ or patent treatment and the
‘Market’ treatment. In a session there were four prize and four market treatments, in alternating
periods, starting with a market treatment. The instances faced by the participants are reported
in table 1.
1.2 KP-instance difficulty
There is no straightforward measure of the difficulty of an instance of the KP. For example, even
though in the worst case an instance of size n + 1 may take twice as much time as one of size
n, this pattern needn’t be satisfied by two arbitrary instances of size n+ 1 and n, respectively. In
order to compare the instances used in our experiment, we propose two measures of difficulty.
A first intuitive measure is a parameter of input size. It is the product of the base-two
logarithm of the knapsack capacity times the size of the instance. The base-two logarithm of the
knapsack capacity is a proxy for the binary representation of the instance parameters, which in
turn represents the amount of storage and information necessary in each step of computation.
This is then multiplied by the size (the number of objects) of the instance. In this measure, two
instances with equal capacity and size are equally difficult.
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Instance & Objects
capacity A B C D E F G H I J K L
I
p 500 350 505 505 640 435 465 50 220 170
w 750 406 564 595 803 489 641 177 330 252
c = 1900 θ∗ 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
II
p 300 350 400 450 47 20 8 70 5 5
w 205 252 352 447 114 50 28 251 19 20
c = 1044 θ∗ 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
III
p 15 14 3 3 10 9 28 28 31 25 24 1
w 129 144 77 77 66 60 184 184 229 184 219 72
c = 850 θ∗ 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
IV
p 37 72 106 32 45 71 23 44 85 62
w 50 820 700 46 220 530 107 180 435 360
c = 1500 θ∗ 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
V
p 2 3 4 5 6 9 8 7 6 5 8 9
w 3 4 6 3 5 13 6 9 2 4 7 7
c = 14 θ∗ 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
VI
p 107 35 120 206 88 34 28 110 88 101 74 53
w 599 196 670 1204 502 202 145 600 453 601 404 299
c = 3800 θ∗ 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
VII
p 201 84 113 303 227 251 129 147 86 127 144 167
w 192 80 106 288 212 240 121 140 82 120 137 160
c = 1300 θ∗ 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
VIII
p 31 141 46 30 74 105 119 160 59 71
w 21 97 32 21 52 75 86 116 43 54
c = 265 θ∗ 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Table 1: Instances of the knapsack problem used in experimental sessions. Objects had common
names, not letters. The letters used in the table stand for: A=Anderson, B=Brown, C=Cole,
D=Darwin, E=Evans, F=Foster, G=Green, H=Hamilton, I=Ives, J=Jensen, K=Keaton, L=Lee.
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The second proposed measure relates to the question of heuristic solvability of an instance.
A simple approximation algorithm for the knapsack problem may solve an instance exactly. For a
class of approximation algorithms described below, we consider an instance that can be exactly
solved with an approximation algorithm in this class to be easier than another instance that cannot
be exactly solved with it.
The simplest approximation algorithm for the knapsack problem is the greedy procedure, which
consists of filling the knapsack in efficiency order - i.e. starting with the objects that have a higher
vi
wi
ratio - until the weight limit is reached. This heuristic is part of a family of approximation
algorithms known as the Sahni approximation scheme [2]. The Sahni scheme is parameterized by
a number k, referring to the specific algorithm, which we call a Sahni algorithm of size k.
A Sahni algorithm of size k looks at all subsets of the set of all objects that are considered to
enter the knapsack, of cardinality k or less. For each subset, it computes the residual weight in
the knapsack after subtracting the weight of the subset, and fills this residual with the remaining
objects using the greedy procedure (if no set of k objects fits in the knapsack, then the exact
optimal solution is found by the algorithm). The value of all knapsacks constructed in this way
is compared, and the one with highest value becomes the approximate solution given by the
algorithm. Clearly, the greedy algorithm is a Sahni algorithm of size 0. The Sahni algorithm of
size 1 uses the greedy algorithm for every subset of size n−1 (there are n such subsets) to fill the
capacity that remains after isolating one object. Though the complexity of the greedy algorithm
run by a Sahni-1 algorithm is smaller than the greedy algorithm run for the original instance
(Sahni-0), the Sahni-1 algorithm must run the greedy algorithm n times. The complexity added
is thus of order n. This is the case for every increase from k to k+1. Although a Sahni algorithm
of size k is not as straightforward as the greedy algorithm, it is still a very simple heuristic.
Definition 1 We say that an instance has Sahni-difficulty level k if it can be exactly solved with
a Sahni algorithm of size k, but not with a Sahni algorithm of size k − 1. The higher the k
associated to an instance, the harder the instance.
While specific instances can be solved using simple heuristics, it is impossible to determine
a-priori what simple heuristic to use. Only after the instance has been solved can one know what
Sahni algorithm to use. Thus, there is no reason to believe that Sahni-k will be a good predictor
of whether a person can solve an instance or not.
The intuitions behind the two proposed measures are simple. Suppose a person uses an obvious
exact algorithm to solve the KP: he computes the value and weight of every possible solution,
then he checks for feasibility, and chooses the highest value among the feasible solutions. In this
case, he should find an instance with a lower input size to be easier than one with a higher input
size. The time he requires to compute the former should be smaller than the time he requires to
compute the latter. On the other hand, suppose a person uses a simple approximation algorithm,
taken from the Sahni family, to solve the KP. Even though an instance with a higher input size
is still harder to deal with, the effect of the input size is relatively small. Instead, this person will
face the problem that he will not find the correct solution to instances that have a difficulty level
that is larger than the k of the algorithm he uses. Hence, even though his computation time is
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Input Size Proxy (n log2 c)
40− 50 80− 90 100− 120 120− 130 140− 150
0 IV
Sahni-
difficulty
level
1 V I
2 VIII III
3 II VI
6 VII
Table 2: Difficulty of Knapsack Problem instances used in experiments. The difficulty is measured
by the proxy of input size (columns) and the Sahni difficulty level.
almost invariant, he will only correctly solve instances with a small enough Sahni-k difficulty level.
Table 2 describes the difficulty of each instance used in the experiment, as measured by both
above-mentioned measures. The first intuitive measure (log2 c) proved to be of little relevance
to our experimental results. Specifically, it did not correlate with the number of people who solve
an instance within a treatment. The Sahni-k measure proved insightful, as described in the main
article.
2 Experimental Design: Additional Details
2.1 Trading mechanism and software
The trading mechanism used in the market treatment was an open-book double auction. This
mechanism has the following properties:
• The markets for each of the tradable securities is open during a fixed amount of time.
• While a market is open, participants can submit limit orders to buy (bids) a given number
of units at a given maximum price, or limit orders to sell (asks) a given number of units
at a given minimum price. Limit orders do not match an outstanding order and, therefore,
become part of a publicly known list of orders (the order book).
• While a market is open, participants may execute trades by sending a market order to buy
that matches (has a price larger than or equal to) an outstanding (limit) order to sell,
or sending a market order to sell that matches (has a price smaller than or equal to) an
outstanding order to buy.
• The trading price is given by the limit order that is executed.
• All orders and transactions are anonymous.
• When markets close, dividends are realized according to a pre-specified rule. In our case,
the rule relates to the solution of the instance of the KP that is being considered. (In
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asset-pricing experiments, the rule is a specific random variable. In commodity-trading
experiments, the rule is a specific private value.)
Additionally, the specific market that we implemented had the property that each participant
could both buy and sell (they did not have assigned buyer or seller roles), participants could
trade several units of each security and, in particular, they could re-trade (resell units previously
acquired). However, participants could not sell short.
Double-auction markets have been extensively studied experimentally, and have proven to
allow for robust convergence of prices to theoretical competitive equilibrium prices in commodity
markets (see [3]), and asset markets (see [1]).
The software used to implement the double auction described above, was eTradeLab.1 This
software displayed the best bid and ask outstanding in all markets, and could display the entire
book for a specific market if requested by the user (through a click). To submit a limit order,
participants had to choose a market (an asset they wish to bid for), choose a type of order - order
to buy or order to sell - and type in a number of units and a limit price for the transaction. To
submit a market order, participants could proceed in the same way as to submit a limit order,
making sure the submitted price matched an existing limit order, or they could click directly on
the marker for best bid or best ask in one of the asset markets. This would immediately generate
a transaction. During an experimental session, all transactions were made and recorded in an
experimental currency called Franc, with an exchange rate of 100F ranc/$.
The more recently developed jMarkets is publicly available and can be used for replication of
our experiment. The experimental sessions run using jMarkets (robustness check, see section 4)
used US Dollars as the experimental currency.
2.2 Implementation of Market Treatment
In the market treatment, subjects were all endowed with an equal number of units of each security.
That is, all subjects started out with 5 units of each traded security. Each security’s dividend was
attached to an item in the KP: if the item was part of the optimal solution, then the security paid
a dividend of $1, it paid $0 otherwise. Additionally, each subject was endowed with $4 to start
trading in the markets.
Clearly, the above endowment combined with the average number of items in the optimal
solution in our instances of the KP, would lead to a large expected payoff for each subject. It was,
however, necessary to give a large endowment, since without it (and without the possibility to sell
short) there would not be enough liquidity to start trading in the markets. In order to ensure that
the total payoff across all subjects in the market treatment equaled the total payoff in the prize
treatment (on average), we used a loan repayment. In type a sessions, where instances I, V, VII,
and VIII were solved in the market treatment, the loan repayment was $23.75. In type b sessions,
where instances II, III, IV, and VI were solved in the market treatment, the loan repayment was
$32.50. This meant that subjects knew in advance that at the end of every market period, their
1This software, a prototype of jMarkets (jmarkets.ssel.caltech.edu), was developed by Tihomir Asparouhov. It
is based on the Marketscape software developed in Charles Plott’s laboratory at Caltech.
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earnings would equal the earnings from trade and dividends, minus the fixed loan repayment (the
exact amount of the loan repayment was also known in advance).
The following simple calculations show that the combination of initial endowment and loan
repayment led to an average total payoff of approximately $66 in the market treatment: Each
subject held 5 units of each asset. Since the number of subjects in our sessions was between
15 and 17, this translated to a total across students of between 75 and 85 units of each asset
in a single market-treatment period. In type a sessions, the optimal knapsacks for each of the
instances solved in the market treatment contained 4, 4, 8, and 3 items, respectively. The assets
corresponding to these items paid a dividend of $1 per unit. Thus, the total dividend that was
distributed between the subjects was 4×75 = $300 ($340 in the case of 17 subjects) for instances
I and V, 8 × 75 = $600 ($680 in the case of 17 subjects) for instance VII, and 3 × 75 = $225
($255 in the case of 17 subjects) for instance VIII. To each of these dividends we must add the
initial cash holdings of $4×15 = $60 (or $4×17 = $68), leading to a total of between $360 and
$408 for instances I and V, between $660 and $748 for instance VII, and between $285 and $323
for instance VIII. Therefore, the average over all market-treatment periods of the total payment
that was divided among subjects before loan repayment lied between $416.25 and $471.75. The
total loan repayment per period lied between $23.75×15 = $356.25 and $23.75×17 = $403.75.
Hence, on average (average taken across market-treatment periods), subjects had a total fund
of between $416.25 − $356.25 = $60 and $471.75 − $403.75 = 68, to divide among them in
a particular market-treatment period. This interval includes $66, which is the amount of money
given as the prize in a prize-treatment period. Analogous calculations lead to the same conclusion
for type b sessions.
2.3 Implementation of Prize Treatment
In the prize treatment, participants were given the instance statement and were allowed to use
only pen and paper to attempt a solution in a fixed window of time. If a participant desired to
submit a solution, he or she had to raise his or her hand to call the attention of the experimenter.
Each participant was allowed to submit only one solution, since the experimenter’s review of his
or her solutions could give different participants privileged information about the correct solution.
If a participant submitted a correct solution, this immediately became public knowledge.
If two (or more) participants raised their hands at moments that were undistinguishable to
the experimenter, and both provided correct answers, a tie was called. In such a case, the prize
of $66 was shared between the tied participants.
2.4 Sessions and subjects
In the main article we report on four experimental sessions run in the end of 2004. All sessions
were run at Caltech, using students as subjects. Three of these sessions had 15 participants, while
the remaining session had 17. The alternative treatment reported below was run in four sessions
in the end of 2006 and beginning of 2007. Two sessions had 14 participants each, one session
had 16, and another had 18 participants.
6
Session
040809a 040929b 041202a 041215b
Average per
person per
period
Asks
6.97 5.38 7.68 5.3
(5.1) (3.6) (4.4) (4)
Bids
6.28 5.15 6.07 5.03
(3.7) (2.9) (4.2) (3.7)
Trades
5.43 4.19 5.63 4.07
(3.8) (3.5) (3.2) (2.7)
Volume
11.07 8.79 12.6 12.88
(8.5) (6.9) (7.8) (9.2)
Average per
security per
period
Asks
8.71 7.62 9.6 6.62
(4.1) (3.6) (4.8) (3.9)
Bids
7.85 7.29 6.07 6.29
(5.3) (3.9) (4.2) (3.7)
Trades
6.79 5.94 7.04 5.08
(3.8) (4.0) (3.2) (3.8)
Volume
13.83 12.46 15.75 16.1
(9.9) (9.0) (9.8) (11.9)
Totals
Asks 418 366 461 318
Bids 377 350 364 302
Trades 326 285 338 244
Volume 664 598 756 773
Table 3: Summaries of trade and bidding activity.
3 Results: Additional Information
Here we report graphically the results for individual experimental sessions. We group specific
periods of several sessions according to the instance of the KP that is given to participants in that
period.
3.1 Trade volume
Tables 3 and 4 summarize information about trading and bidding volume.
3.2 Prices and Holdings
Figures 1 to 8 contain three panels each. The first two panels show the evolution of asset prices
in experimental time for each experimental session where the instance at hand was solved under
the market treatment. Assets are divided in ‘IN’ and ‘OUT’. ‘IN’ assets are those related to items
that pertain to the set that solves the instance. ‘OUT’ assets are those related to items that are
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Session
040809a 040929b 041202a 041215b
Trade
volume
IN 15.4 10.7 17.3 12.5
OUT 14.9 17.7 17.12 24.9
Asks
IN 7.9 6.0 9.5 5.3
OUT 10.7 11.7 11.2 10.1
Bids
IN 10.9 8.0 9.8 6.3
OUT 6.8 7.9 7.1 7.7
Table 4: Volume of trade and number of bids and asks, for IN and OUT securities.
left out of the set that solves the instance. The third panel shows the empirical pdf of the prices
of ‘IN’ and the prices of ‘OUT’ securities, for the instance at hand. Not all securities were traded
at every moment in time, and some securities were traded only once (they are displayed as a dot,
not a line, in the figure).
Prices of ‘IN’ and ‘OUT’ securities almost never equaled 1 or 0 respectively, because one could
never be sure whether a single item was in or out of the optimal solution without knowing the
optimal solution. To be sure that one knew the optimal solution one had to solve the instance
exactly, meaning that all the possible solutions needed to be listed and compared. Also, one should
refrain from interpreting the prices as conditional probabilities of whether the item is in or out
of the optimal solution. Computation of this probability requires that one know the likelihoods,
which in itself pre-supposes a list of all possible solutions and their values. If a subject were able
to produce such a list and compare values in the limited time s/he had, then s/he would also
be able to compute the value of each possible knapsack and hence, produce the exact optimal
solution. Bayesian updating of a prior in order to produce probabilities of items’ belonging to the
optimal solution, is simply not a viable model of learning in the KP.
Figure 9 shows the histogram of final holdings of the participants for every instance of the KP.
For every instance, the histogram is plotted for each asset (one can think there is one histogram
“per column”). Even though a holding of 5 units of an asset is always the modal number of units,
it is easy to see that holdings take on many different values. This also means that there was
in general a substantial amount of trade, because all subjects started out with the same initial
allocations (5 units).
4 Alternative experimental setup
In addition to the experiments reported in the main body of the article, four experimental sessions
were run that differed in several ways from the original experimental setup (instructions for this
alternative setup can be found at http://clef.caltech.edu/exp/knapsack/). The market treatment
differed in the following aspects:
• The time markets were open was reduced from 15 to 10 minutes. The reason for this
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Figure 1: Instance I. The red lines are prices of ‘OUT’ securities, the blue lines of ‘IN’ securities.
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Figure 2: Instance II. The red lines are prices of ‘OUT’ securities, the blue lines of ‘IN’ securities.
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Figure 3: Instance III. The red lines are prices of ‘OUT’ securities, the blue lines of ‘IN’ securities.
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Figure 4: Instance IV. The red lines are prices of ‘OUT’ securities, the blue lines of ‘IN’ securities.
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Figure 5: Instance V. The red lines are prices of ‘OUT’ securities, the blue lines of ‘IN’ securities.
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Instance VI
Time, in seconds
P
ri
ce
, 
in
 U
S
D
 c
en
ts
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Instance VI
Time, in seconds
P
ri
ce
, 
in
 U
S
D
 c
en
ts
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
Prices, in USD cents
E
m
pi
ric
al
 p
df
Instance VI
 
 
IN
OUT
Figure 6: Instance VI. The red lines are prices of ‘OUT’ securities, the blue lines of ‘IN’ securities.
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Figure 7: Instance VII. The red lines are prices of ‘OUT’ securities, the blue lines of ‘IN’ securities.
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Figure 8: Instance VIII. The red lines are prices of ‘OUT’ securities, the blue lines of ‘IN’ securities.
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(b) Instance II
A B C D E F G H I J K L
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Security
U
ni
ts
 in
 fi
na
l p
or
tfo
lio
 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
(c) Instance III
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(d) Instance IV
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(f) Instance VI
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Figure 9: Histogram of final security holdings for each instance of the KP (aggregate over exper-
imental sessions). The colors indicate the frequencies of given number of units for each security.
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change was to match the duration of the markets and the prize periods, while keeping the
total duration of an experimental session manageable.
• The market software used was changed to jMarkets. This was done mainly because the
quality of jMarkets was superior to that of the previously used software (eTradeLab); it is
more reliable, faster, and especially easier for subjects (all order submissions are “point and
click”, so no mistakes occur because of typing of numbers). It is important to point out that
the difference between the two softwares are only of “form”, and not of substance. Both
softwares implement exactly the same type of financial markets.
On the other hand, the prize treatment was changed in more significant ways. The main
changes were the following:
• The maximum duration of the prize-treatment period was raised from 7 to 10 minutes. In
this way, the duration of the market and prize periods was equalized.
• Instead of raising their hand, participants had to submit their answers to the experimenter
using a chat program called skype. The program immediately time-tagged the submission,
and fixed it in the experimenter’s computer screen.
• If a correct solution was received by the experimenter over skype at a time before the end
of the period, this was NOT announced. The time tag of the winning submission (first
correct answer submission) was recorded, but other participants were unaware that there
was already a winner.
In terms of setup and results, the third bullet above is the most relevant. We must remark,
however, that this pushes the prize treatment away from a standard patent system: once a
discovery is patented, it is publicly known, and it becomes unprofitable for others to continue
pursuit of the discovery.
4.1 Results of alternative setup
The main change in results from the original to the alternative setup is in the number of voluntarily-
handed in solutions that are correct under the prize treatment. It is no longer lower than the
number of (voluntarily-handed in) solutions under the market treatment. Instead, the numbers
described in table 5 emerge. Unlike in the baseline setup, there is not a clear winner: the markets
and prize treatments perform equally well.
However, the prices in the market treatment of the alternative setup show an even clearer
separation of ‘IN’ and ‘OUT’ securities. This is probably because the software is easier to use;
specifically, typing mistakes cannot occur, by design. Here we only show the probability density
functions (fig. 10).
The correlation between instance difficulty and the number of participants that find the solution
in each treatment is still patent (fig. 11). It is, however, difficult to make a comparison between
this figure and the analogous figure (displayed in the main article) for the original experiment.
Firstly, the prize treatment differs from the original experiment in an important aspect. Unlike
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Instance
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
Fraction Correct
(%)
Market 32.14 14.71 11.76 26.47 32.14 5.88 3.57 21.43
Prize 17.65 28.57 46.43 57.14 38.24 10.71 0.00 17.65
Table 5: Percentage of total number of participants that marked the correct answer to each
instance on their answer sheets – alternative setup.
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Figure 10: Empirical pdf of prices of ‘IN’ and ‘OUT’ securities for all instances of the KP. Results
from the alternative experimental setup.
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Figure 11: Fraction of all participants that found the correct solution to an instance, as a function
of Sahni difficulty of the instance. The lines are the OLS fits of the data points. Red triangles
and the red line correspond to the prize treatment, while the blue circles and blue line correspond
to the market treatment.
in the main experiment (and a true patent system), we did not announce whether the optimal
solution was found until the end of the period. Yet only the first subject to find the solution was
paid; this feature provided explicit monetary incentives for subjects to continue to work on solving
the problem even after someone had found the solution.
Secondly, in the alternative setup we had a large number of non-respondents, which obscured
the interpretation of response data. Specifically, the fact that in the alternative setup the markets
system did not get any time advantage, substantially decreased the number of subjects that handed
in their suggested solution in the markets treatment: more than 1 out of 4 subjects now became
non-responsive and never handed in anything. This made it difficult to objectively interpret the
results of the second set of experiments: the performance of the markets system was likely to be
underestimated, but we did not know by how much. Now, when interpreting non-responsiveness
as an indication that the subject did not know the correct answer, the performance of the markets
system was indeed reduced – but only for easy knapsack problems. This is clearly visible in figure
11.
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